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ABSTRACT    
How  can  competition  enhance  bank  soundness?  Does  competition  improve  soundness  via  the 
efficiency channel? Do banks heterogeneously respond to competition? To answer these questions, 
we exploit an innovative measure of competition [Boone, J., A new way to measure competition, 
EconJnl, Vol. 118, pp. 1245-1261] that captures the reallocation of profits from inefficient banks to 
their efficient counterparts. Based on two complementary datasets for Europe and the U.S., we first 
establish that the new competition indicator captures a broad variety of other characteristics of 
competition in a consistent manner. Second, we verify that competition increases efficiency. Third, 
we present novel evidence that efficiency is the conduit through which competition contributes to 
bank soundness. In a final examination of banks’ heterogeneous responses to competition, we find 
that smaller banks’ soundness measures respond more strongly to competition than larger banks’ 
soundness measures, and two-stage quantile regressions indicate that the soundness-enhancing effect 
of competition is larger in magnitude for sound banks than for fragile banks.   
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“if banks were strengthened by the gymnastics of competition, the  
banking system would be stronger and more resilient to shocks.” 
 
Padoa-Schioppa (2001, p. 16) 
1. Introduction 
Recent years have been marked by a shift in theory and evidence concerning the effect of 
competition on bank soundness. The traditional literature points towards a negative trade-off 
between  competition  and  bank  soundness  (e.g.,  Keeley,  1990).  However,  new  theory  and 
evidence challenge this paradigm. At present, the balance of evidence suggests a positive link 
between competition and soundness (e.g., Carletti et al., 2007; Schaeck et al., 2009). 
While the debate of whether competition is “good” or “bad” for bank soundness continues 
(Berger et al., 2009), the question of why competition has a soundness-enhancing effect has 
remained an underexplored area, despite its relevance for policy and regulation in banking.  
In  this  paper,  we  therefore  turn  to  the  analysis  of  the  mechanisms  through  which 
competition affects soundness. Specifically, we seek to answer the following questions: Is there 
a link from competition to soundness via the competition-efficiency nexus as proposed in the 
industrial organization literature? Do banks heterogeneously respond to competition, i.e., are 
there any differences in the way small and large banks and sound and fragile banks are affected 
by competition? To preview our results, the answer is “yes” in all cases. 
Using two complementary datasets, one for European banks, and one for single-market 
banks  operating  in  rural  areas  in  the  U.S.,  we  offer  several  innovations  in  the  debate  on 
competition and bank soundness.  
First, to investigate the mechanism by which competition contributes to greater soundness, 
we  compute  a  novel  measure  of  competition,  the  Boone  (2008)  indicator.  This  indicator 
focuses  on  the  impact  of  competition  on  the  performance  of  efficient  banks,  and  allows 
providing  an  industrial  organization-based  explanation  for  why  competition  enhances 
soundness.  We  focus  on  efficiency  as  a  possible  conduit  because  it  can  be  shown  that 
competition  motivates  banks  to  specialize  and  differentiate  themselves  to  maintain  high 
profits. For instance, Zarutskie (2009) argues that competition makes banks more cost efficient 
relative to their competitors by either specializing in certain types of lending or, alternatively, 
by improving screening abilities for borrowers in particular segments of the credit market, and 
Dick  and  Lehnert  (2010)  provide  evidence  that  competition  increases  banks’  lending 
productivity and lowers loss rates on loans. In other words, these papers suggest that more - 3 - 
 
efficient lending decisions of some institutions in response to competition can increase these 
banks’ profitability relative to their competitors. The Boone indicator exploits this reallocation 
of  profits  from  inefficient  to  efficient  banks  and  is  consequently  well  suited  to  test  our 
hypothesis. To verify the validity of the indicator as a measure of competition for the banking 
industry, we examine in the first step of our analysis how it lines up with traditional measures 
of competition. This analysis shows that the Boone indicator captures a large proportion of the 
variation in other characteristics of competition.  
Second, we focus on the direct effect of competition on efficiency using methods developed 
in the frontier efficiency literature. This examination is critical for our hypothesis because the 
proposed transmission mechanism rests on the assumption that competition drives efficiency. 
Here, we find support for the notion that efficiency increases in competitive environments.  
Third, we analyze the link between competition and soundness via the efficiency channel, 
exploiting the unique properties of the Boone indicator. This analysis yields robust evidence 
that  the  beneficial  effect  of  competition  on  soundness  is  due  to  a  reallocation  of  profits 
because competition, measured by the Boone indicator, is positively linked with profitability. 
Fourth, we examine banks’ heterogeneous responses to competition, and ascertain whether 
different organizational forms that have implications for the type of lending technology can 
affect soundness differently. The results indicate that smaller banks that tend to make loans 
based on soft information are more responsive to competition in terms of increasing their 
soundness. Exploiting two-stage quantile regression to focus on whether sound banks respond 
differently  than  weak  banks  to  competition,  we  find  that  fragile  banks  benefit  less  from 
competition than more stable banks. 
A policy implication of our results is that policies promoting competition may have positive 
impacts  on  efficiency  and  soundness.  An  example  of  such  policies  is  the  single  banking 
passport in the EU which deregulated banking markets with the idea to create a level playing 
field for competition. Another implication arises from the quantile regressions, which indicate 
that policymakers need to consider that competition affects the soundness of the institutions 
in the relevant market differently depending on the health of the banks in that market. 
The paper is structured as follows. We develop hypotheses in Section 2. Section 3 provides 
an overview of the dataset and methodology. Section 4 reports results and Section 5 concludes.   
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2. Hypotheses on Competition, Efficiency, and Bank Soundness 
Information asymmetries can affect the degree of competition, and the efficiency of lending 
decisions  in  banking.  This  reflects  that  banks  generate  proprietary  information  through 
lending  activities that provide an information  advantage over other,  less  informed lenders 
(Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2008). At the same time, studies in industrial organization suggest 
that competition increases efficiency (Tirole, 1989; Hay and Liu, 1997), and banking research 
reports  evidence  that  efficient  institutions  maintain  better  screening  and  monitoring 
procedures. This makes them less likely to suffer from non-performing loans (Wheelock and 
Wilson, 1995). Consequently, examining the mechanism by which competition can contribute 
to bank soundness suggests a consideration of the effect of competition on bank efficiency in 
the first place before the nexus between competition and soundness can be explored.  
Based on these key considerations, we derive testable hypotheses to investigate the possible 
transmission mechanism from competition to bank soundness. Specifically, we hypothesize 
that efficiency could be the conduit through which competition contributes to greater bank 
soundness.  For  this  analysis,  we  use  a  modified  version  of  a  new  competition  indicator 
developed in the industrial organization literature in a series of papers by Boone et al. (2005), 
and Boone (2008). This indicator is based on the efficiency hypothesis proposed by Demsetz 
(1973), which stresses that industry performance is an endogenous function of the growth of 
efficient firms. Put simply, the indicator gauges the strength of the relation between efficiency 
(measured in terms of average cost) and performance (measured in terms of profitability). 
Our Hypothesis: Competition increases soundness via the efficiency channel 
Based on industrial organization theory, we expect more competitive environments to result 
in more efficient lending decisions, which ultimately increases soundness. We offer several 
arguments for why competition may have such beneficial effects. 
The  industrial  organization  literature  has  arrived  at  a  consensus  according  to  which 
competition triggers a reallocation of profits and market shares towards better, more efficient 
firms  (e.g.,  Olley  and  Pakes,  1996).  More  efficient  firms  outperform  their  less  efficient 
counterparts in terms of profits and size, and this fosters industry-wide efficiency.  
For  banks,  Stiroh  (2000)  shows  that  dynamic  reallocation  of  assets  from  weak  to  well 
performing  banks  maintains  profits  on  the  industry  level,  and  Stiroh  and  Strahan  (2003) 
report that competition, captured by deregulation, reallocates profits from weak banks toward - 5 - 
 
better  run  institutions.  This  reallocation  effect  can  operate  through  different  channels. 
Zarutskie (2009) shows that banks respond to competition by specialization: they adjust their 
lending technologies and focus on certain types of loans, which enables them to lower the 
costs of processing and originating loans, or they become better at screening particular groups 
of borrowers. Dick and  Lehnert (2010) also find evidence that competition raises lending 
efficiency and lowers banks’ credit risk. Reductions in credit risk can be due to the fact that 
banks faced with threat of entry devote resources to screening and monitoring of borrowers, 
this reduces problems related to information asymmetries (Chen, 2007). In short, competition 
enhances the efficiency of lending decisions.  
Information processing capabilities may also play a role. Greater availability of information 
in  competitive  environments  can  improve  banks’  abilities  for  screening  and  monitoring 
(Hauswald  and  Marquez,  2003).  Provided  that  banks  obtain  information  about  borrowers 
from previous loans, the efficiency of lending decisions increases as a result of learning by 
lending  (Dell’Ariccia  et  al.,  1999).  This  suggests  a  corresponding  decrease  in  the  cost  of 
screening,  or,  equivalently,  an  increase  in  its  informativeness  which  leads  to  better  loan 
differentiation and more adequate risk pricing.  
These  considerations  deliver  two  empirical  predictions:  First,  competition  enhances 
efficiency. Second, efficient banks are sounder.   
These  predictions  are  supported  in  two  strands  of  the  empirical  literature.  Berger  and 
Hannan (1998) show that banks operating  in uncompetitive markets are more inefficient. 
Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) report that deregulation increases efficiency, and DeYoung et al. 
(1998)  show  that  removing  interstate  branching  restrictions  motivates  banks  to  improve 
efficiency. Similarly, Evanoff and Örs (2008) report that incumbent banks respond to threats 
of  competition  by  improving  efficiency.  The  literature  is  also  clear  on  the  link  between 
efficiency and soundness. Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) show 
that efficiency is positively associated with soundness.  
Our paper aims to draw together these different strands of literature to provide a more 
comprehensive framework for the analysis of the mechanism by which competition enhances 
bank soundness.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
We use two samples. The benefit of using two samples lays in the fact that they complement 
each other. Our first sample is a panel dataset for European banks, covering the period 1995–
2005.  This  dataset  is  representative  for  European  banking  systems  and  not  affected  by 
selection problems. Unlike our second dataset, the European sample allows considering the 
evolution  of  competition  over  time.  However,  using  this  dataset  comes  at  the  cost  of 
measurement problems that arise from the inclusion of many large and internationally active 
banks for which we have to make the assumption that their market is the respective domestic 
market. Our second dataset is a cross-sectional sample of single-market banks operating in 
rural counties in the U.S. in 2005. While this sample is not representative, exploiting this 
sample not only offers an opportunity to evaluate the proposed transmission mechanism from 
competition to soundness on a highly disaggregate level but also enables higher precision with 
respect to defining the boundaries of the relevant banking markets.   
European sample characteristics 
We  primarily  focus  on  the  European  sample  because  it  provides  a  fertile  ground  for 
analyzing the effects of changes in competition. In the 1990s, European banks experienced 
changes in the regulation aimed at creating a level playing field for competition.   
To construct this sample, we obtain data for Europe from BankScope. The sample covers 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, 
and the U.K.
1 We exclude Spain and Sweden as we cannot compute estimates for the Boone 
indicator. The final sample consists of 17,965 bank-year observations for 3,325 banks, 5,705 
are savings banks, 9,297 are cooperatives, and 2,963 are commercial banks.  
U.S. sample characteristics  
For the U.S., we use a sample of banks that operate exclusively in rural, non-core based 
statistical  areas  (non-CBSA).
2  We  do  not  claim  that  the  data  are  representative  for  the 
population. However, this approach has the benefit that it permits a ‘laboratory type’ test for 
the effect of competition on banks that operate exclusively in one market. The intuition is that 
retail banking markets are local in nature because customers obtain banking services from 
nearby providers (Cohen and Mazzeo, 2007). Moreover, such banks are not to ‘too big to fail’ 
policies that distort competition.  
                                                 
1   Whenever possible, we use consolidated data to avoid double counting.    
2   Non-CBSAs are defined as areas with less than 10,000 inhabitants. - 7 - 
 
Thanks to researchers at Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, we obtained 
data on Herfindahl Hirschman Indices (HHIs) for local deposit markets. The FRB maintains a 
database for HHIs for rural, non-CBSA markets, whereby a market is defined by a county’s 
boundaries.  With  help  from  researchers  from  the  FDIC,  we  also  obtained  location 
information for the banks’ main offices and branches from the Summary of Deposits.
3 We 
integrate these datasets focusing on a cross-section from June 2005, match the data with Call 
Reports, and impose the following two criteria: First, we exclude banks that operate across 
counties  so  that  all  branches  (including  the  main  office)  are  located  within  the  county’s 
boundaries. Second, to obtain econometrically reasonable estimates for the Boone indicator, 
we only include rural non-CBSA counties with at least seven banks. The resulting dataset 
allows performing tests of our hypothesis on an extraordinarily high level of disaggregation.  
While our initial dataset for single-market banks consists of more than 2,600 institutions, 
imposing these criteria reduces the sample to a maximum of 382 banks that operate in 43 local 
banking  markets  in  eleven  states.
4  Table  1  indicates  a  large  degree  of  variation  in  these 
markets. For instance, the HHI varies between 0.09 and 0.87. Banks in these areas hold an 
average market share of 13 percent, with some having a dominant position of 70 percent. 
[TABLE 1] 
Competition expressed as a function of bank efficiency: The Boone indicator 
To examine the effect of competition via the efficiency channel on bank soundness, we 
express  competition  as  a  function  of  efficiency.  We  therefore  use  an  innovation  in  the 
industrial  organization  literature  and  use  a  modified  version  of  an  indicator  proposed  by 
Boone et al. (2005), and further developed by Boone (2008).  
This indicator is based on the efficient structure hypothesis that associates performance 
with differences in efficiency. Under this hypothesis, we expect that more efficient banks, i.e. 
banks with lower marginal costs, achieve superior performance in the sense of higher profits at 
the expense of their less efficient counterparts, and this effect is monotonically increasing in 
the  degree  of  competition  when  firms  interact  more  aggressively  and  when  entry  barriers 
                                                 
3   We are indebted to Dean Amel and Elizabeth Kiser from the Federal Reserve Board and Gary Fissel from the 
FDIC for providing us with these data. We perform our tests on a cross-section of data only as integrating a 
time dimension into this non-userfriendly dataset proves difficult.  
4   The states are Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, 
Texas, and Wisconsin.  - 8 - 
 
decline.  Thus,  the  Boone  indicator  theoretically  underpins  findings  by  Stiroh  (2000)  and 
Stiroh and Strahan (2003) who state that increased competition allows banking markets to 
transfer considerable portions of assets from low profit to high profit banks. 
As  shown  theoretically  in  Boone  (2008),  the  reallocation  effect  is  a  general  feature  of 
intensifying  competition,  so  that  the  indicator  can  be  seen  as  a  robust  measure  of 
competition.
5  While  different  forces  can  cause  increases  in  competition,  e.g.  increases  in 
suppliers of banking services through lower entry cost, more aggressive interaction between 
banks (shift from Cournot to Bertrand competition), or banks’ relative inefficiencies, as long 
as the reallocation conditions holds, the indicator remains valid. As the industry becomes 
more competitive, given a certain level of efficiency of each individual bank, the profits of the 
more efficient ones increase relative to those of the less efficient banks. 
Following Boone et al. (2005) and van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007), we can write a banking 
system demand function in which bank i produces a product (or product portfolio) qi so that  
( ) , i j i i j j i p q q a bq d q ≠ ≠ = − − ∑               (1) 
whereby each bank has constant marginal cost  i c . The parameter a captures market size, and 
b denotes the market elasticity of demand. We use the parameter d  to characterize the extent 
to which consumers see the different products in a market as close substitutes for each other. 
It is assumed that a > ci and 0 < d ≤ b. To maximize profits, the bank decides on the optimal 
output level qi  so that 
                                                 
5   We note that the Boone indicator has a number of other appealing features. For instance, it overcomes many 
of the shortcomings of other traditionally used proxies for competition such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index and the 3-bank concentration ratio that aim to infer competitive conduct by examining concentration 
levels in banking (Degryse et al., 2009). Unlike these concentration indices, the Boone indicator is able to 
capture interaction among banks by focussing on conduct, whereas concentration ratios only capture the 
outcomes of competitive conduct. For instance, fierce competition leads to exit of banks via failure or merger, 
thus raising concentration in the system. Relying on concentration measures will yield misleading inferences 
as  high  levels  of  concentration  are  frequently  considered  to  be  indicative  for  a  lack  of  competition. 
Unsurprisingly, empirical studies that examine the link between competition and concentration in banking 
such as Claessens and Laeven (2004) conclude therefore that concentration is a poor proxy for competition. 
In addition, other widely used measures of competition in the empirical banking literature such as the Panzar 
and Rosse (1987) H-Statistic require restrictive assumptions about the banking market  being in long-run 
equilibrium, and the frequently used Lerner index suffers from the problem that it is criticized for not being 
able to appropriately capture the degree of product substitutability (Vives, 2008). The Boone model neither 
requires the assumption of long-run equilibrium, nor does it suffer from the problem relating to product 
substitutability. What matters for the Boone indicator is how aggressively the more efficient banks exploit 
their cost advantage to reallocate profits away from the least efficient banks in the market.   
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( ) i i i i p c q π = −                   (2) 
The first order condition for equilibrium is then given by  
2 0 i j i i j a bq d q c
≠ − − − = ∑ .                (3) 
For a banking system with N banks that produce positive levels of output, one obtains N 
first order conditions (3)  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 2 / 1 2 / 1 / 2 1 2 / 1 i i i j j q c b d a b d N c c b d N b d     = − − + − + + − −     ∑ .  (4) 
Eq. (4) illustrates the relation between output and marginal cost, and we can see from Eq. 
(2) that profits depend on marginal cost in a quadratic way. If profits πi are defined as variable 
profits excluding entry costs ￿, a bank will only enter the market if, and only if, πi ≥ ￿. 
Based  on  these  properties,  competition  increases  for  two  reasons:  First,  competition 
increases when the products offered by different banks become closer substitutes and banks 
interact more aggressively, i.e., d increases (assuming that d < b). Second, competition increases 
if  entry  costs     decline.  Boone  (2008)  proves  that  performance  of  more  efficient  firms 
improves under both these regimes.  
Assuming that the relation between profits  i π  and marginal costs ci is downward sloping, it 
follows that higher marginal cost imply lower margins per unit of output for a given price. 
Moreover, if higher marginal cost lead to higher prices, output is reduced and market share 
declines.  
For the empirical implementation, we characterize the Boone model for bank i as follows 
ln( ) it it c π α β = + ,                (5) 
where  it π  measures profits of bank i at time t,  β  is referred to as the Boone indicator,  and 
it c  denotes marginal costs. Since we cannot observe marginal costs directly, we use average 
costs as a proxy.  
We regress ROA on average cost to obtain information on how much performance covaries 
with cost. The intuition is as follows: while an increase in costs reduces profits in all markets, 
the same percentage increase in a more competitive market leads to a greater decline in profits 
because banks are punished more harshly for being inefficient. The indicator exploits this 
property  because  it  measures  the  extent  to  which  differences  in  efficiency  are  reflected  in 
performance  differences.  In  other  words,  the  Boone  indicator  expresses  the  reduction  of - 10 - 
 
profits that arises from cost inefficiencies. The indicator is well suited for the objective of 
expressing competition as a function of efficiency because cost inefficiencies often reflect poor 
lending decisions.
6   
In our empirical setup, we also include a bank-specific effect to allow for heterogeneity. 
Since  we  are  interested  in  the  varying  effect  of  competition  on  soundness  over  time,  we 
estimate the Boone model as follows 
1,..., 1,..., 1 ln( ) it i t t it t t it t T t T d c d u π α β γ
= = − = + + + ∑ ∑                   (6) 
where  it π  are the profits of bank i at time  t as a proportion of total assets,  it c  is average 
variable costs,  t d  is a time dummy and  it u  is the error term. Profits increase for banks with 
lower marginal costs (β <0). Thus, an increase in competition raises profits of a more efficient 
bank relative to a less efficient one. The stronger the effect (i.e., the larger theβ  in absolute 
value), the stronger is competition. 
  Estimating the Boone indicator  
As the first step to computing the Boone indicator, we use average cost of bank i as a share 
of total income. Average costs comprise interest and personnel expenses, administrative and 
other  operating  expenses.  Income  consists  of  commission  and  trading  income,  interest 
income, fee income, and other operating income.  
European sample 
For Europe, we estimate the relation between profitability, measured by ROA, and average 
costs based on Eq. (6) using a GMM-style estimator, whereby we use one year lagged values of 
the  explanatory  variables  as  instruments.  Our  choice  of  a  GMM-style  estimator  is  due  to 
concerns that performance and cost are jointly determined. Banks that are large relative to the 
system might benefit from lower cost of production due to market power. The efficiency gains 
of the two-step GMM estimator relative to a traditional instrumental variables estimator derive 
from  the  use  of  the  optimal  weighting  matrix,  the  overidentifying  restrictions,  and  the 
relaxation of the i.i.d. assumption. In our estimations, the coefficients for the Boone indicator 
are negative and significant. More details are presented in Panel A of Appendix I.  
 [FIGURE 1] 
                                                 
6  For  instance,  poor  lending  decisions  will  give  rise  to  additional  cost  that  arise  from  resource  intensive 
monitoring of delinquent borrowers, analysis of workout arrangements, and seizing and disposing of collateral 
(Berger and DeYoung, 1997).  - 11 - 
 
Figure 1 illustrates how competition evolved in Europe. The Dutch banking system is the 
most competitive one, followed by the U.K. and Switzerland. In terms of the rankings of 
competition, our results are in line with Carbo et al. (2009). The greater variation in the 
Boone indicator for the Netherlands reflects a process of reorganisation in the late 1990s (van 
Leuvensteijn et al., 2007). Germany exhibits a low degree of competition. This finding is due 
to the fact that major proportions of the market are shielded from competition as co-operatives 
and savings banks only operate in local markets.
7   
To analyze whether the Boone indicator is a valid measure of competition in banking, we 
perform two tests: First, we analyze if its theoretical assumptions hold. Second, we examine 
how the indicator lines up with other characteristics of competition.  
For the analysis of the theoretical assumptions it is important to recall that competition 
increases according to the Boone model under the two regimes of more aggressive interaction 
and  declines  of  entry  costs,  or  when  product  substitutes  emerge.  We  approximate  banks’ 
potential for aggressive competition and the decline of entry costs using an index of activity 
restrictions and data for the proportion of rejected applications for bank licences relative to 
the number of applications received.
8 To capture information on product substitutes, we use 
ratios for stock market total value traded and insurance premiums to GDP because insurance 
policies and stock market investments are close substitutes for bank products.    
In our tests, we first examine correlations of the Boone indicator with the other variables. 
To investigate whether these measures can be substituted for each other, we then regress the 
Boone  indicator  on  each  one  of  the  other  variables  individually.  A  coefficient  of 
determination (R
2) of 1.00 indicates that the measures would be perfect substitutes. Finally, we 
regress the indicator on all other variables jointly.
9  
                                                 
7   We note that larger European countries exhibit comparatively flat Boone indicators during the sampling 
period, and we are concerned that most of the variation stems from the Dutch and the Danish banking 
systems. In unreported regressions, we drop those countries and obtain qualitatively identical results to those 
reported in Section 4. 
8   The data for activity restrictions and the proportion of entry applications denied are taken from the survey by 
Barth et al. (2001) and averaged for the three waves of the survey. We use an index of activity restrictions that 
takes  on  values  between  1  and  4.  The  index  provides  information  about  whether  banks  can  engage  in 
securities, real estate, and insurance activities, and whether banks can hold stakes in non-financial firms. Larger 
values indicate more restrictions. Entry denied is the ratio of the number of entry applications by domestic and 
foreign banks into the industry relative to total entry applications. 
 
9   This analysis is based on mean values of the Boone indicator, because some of the variables that capture other 
features of competition such as the data on government ownership are only available as a cross-section. As a 
consequence, n=10 for the European sample and n=43 for the U.S. sample. - 12 - 
 
 Panel A in Table 2 shows positive correlations between the Boone indicator and the index 
for  activity  restrictions  and  denied  entry  applications,  suggesting  less  competition  when 
regulators  impose  restrictions  and  when  applications  for  bank  charters  are  rejected.  The 
coefficient of determination R
2 (1) indicates that more than one tenth of the variation in the 
Boone  indicator  can  be  explained  by  activity  restrictions.
10  The  correlations  between  the 
indicator  and  our  measures  for  substitutes  are  negative,  lending  support  to  the  idea  that 
competition increases when stock markets and insurance products gain importance in Europe. 
More than 44 percent of the variation in the Boone indicator is explained by stock market 
total value traded to GDP. Thus, this analysis indicates that the theoretical assumptions of the 
indicator are well reflected in empirical regularities.   
Analyzing correlations between the indicator and other characteristics of competition such 
as the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-Statistic, government ownership of banks, and the Financial 
Freedom index also suggest that the indicator is intuitively linked with competition.
 11  
 The negative correlation between the H-Statistic and the Boone indicator shows that both 
measures provide similar indications because the H-Statistic is increasing in competition.
12 The 
relation between the Financial Freedom Index and the indicator is also negative. This indicates 
that competition is higher in systems with more freedom. Moreover, the regression of the 
Boone indicator on the Financial Freedom Index highlights that 66 percent of the information 
contained in the Boone indicator is also reflected in the Financial Freedom Index. In line with 
intuition, government ownership is positively correlated with the indicator.  
The OLS regression of the indicator on all other features of competition shows that the 
Boone indicator reflects more than 80 percent of the information that is contained in these 
other  variables.  This  result  reinforces  the  idea  of  employing  the  Boone  indicator  for  our 
purpose because it captures a broad variety of other characteristics of competition.
13  
                                                 
10   Note that there is agreement in the literature that there is generally little relationship between traditional 
measures of competition. Carbo et al. (2009) offer a detailed discussion of this matter.  
11   Information  on  government ownership  is  obtained  from  the  updated  dataset  in  Barth  et  al.  (2001)  and 
averaged over the three waves of the survey. The Financial Freedom Index is obtained from the Heritage 
Foundation. It measures banking independence from government control and state interference into banking 
business (ranging from 0=no freedom to 100=maximum freedom). 
12  The H-Statistic discriminates between competitive, monopolistically competitive, and monopolistic markets. It 
is calculated by estimating the sum of the elasticities of reduced form revenue equations with respect to factor 
input prices. The H-Statistic ranges between –∞ and 1, whereby higher values indicate greater competition (for 
details see Claessens and Laeven, 2004, and the notes to Table 2).  
13   Our R
2 measures are higher than those reported in Carbo et al. (2009). They compare the consistency of HHI, 
net interest margins, H-Statistics, Lerner indices, and ROA in 14 European countries with each other and - 13 - 
 
U.S. sample 
For the U.S., we estimate the Boone indicator by a similar regression of ROA on average 
cost. While we perform the ultimate analysis of the effect of the Boone indicator on soundness 
in a cross-sectional setting, we obtain Call Report data for 1995-2005 to estimate the indicator 
because we need a sufficiently large number of observations to compute reasonable estimates. 
We use a simplified version of Eq. (6) as detailed in the notes to Panel B of Appendix I to 
estimate  the  indicator.  As  instruments  for  average  costs,  we  use  one  and  two-year  lags  of 
average costs. This setup allows computing the Hansen J-Test. The regressions in Appendix I 
indicate considerable explanatory power, and the indicator is significant at conventional levels. 
Figure 2 plots the Boone indicators for rural banking markets in the U.S. 
[FIGURE 2] 
Since  the  U.S.  sample  only  includes  selected  counties,  we  lack  information  for  activity 
restrictions, denied bank charters, and government ownership. While we also have no data on 
insurance premiums and stock market activity on the county level, we can still examine the 
association of the Boone indicator with two other characteristics of competition. 
First, we calculate again H-Statistics and confirm the negative association of the Boone 
indicator with the H-Statistic (Table 2, Panel B). More than 15 percent in the variation of the 
Boone indicator is reflected in the H-Statistic. Second, since we have population data and 
information about the number of bank branch offices in these markets from the Summary of 
Deposits, we test the relation between branch density, measured by the ratio of branches to 
population, and the Boone indicator. The negative correlation suggests that competition is 
higher in markets with greater branch density. Both findings confirm that the Boone indicator 
is also intuitively associated with other features of competition in rural markets in the U.S.  
 [TABLE 2] 
  The effect of competition on bank efficiency 
Recall that our main hypothesis that efficiency is the conduit through which competition 
enhances soundness rests on the assumption that competition increases bank efficiency. As a 
further preliminary step in our analysis, we need to ascertain that this is the case. For the 
European sample, we estimate panel data models as follows 
                                                                                                                                                       
obtain  a  maximum  R
2  value  of  0.37.  Thus,  the  Boone  indicator  captures  substantially  more,  and  more 
consistently the information in other measures of competition.  - 14 - 
 
        =∝ +     +       +       +              (7)  
where  Effijt  denotes  cost  efficiency  of  bank  i  in  country  j  at  time  t.  We  estimate  cost 
efficiency using stochastic frontier techniques as detailed  in Appendix II. Bjt is the Boone 
indicator in country j at time t, X is a vector of bank-specific, and C is a vector of country-
specific variables. Given that lower values of the Boone indicator signify more competition, we 
expect an inverse relation between the indicator and efficiency.  
We choose control variables that affect efficiency. We include market share because banks 
that are large relative to their market can charge higher prices. Total assets (log), asset growth, 
and asset growth squared are also included. We control for asset growth because an expanding 
bank may not keep efficiency under control and anticipate an inverse link between growth and 
efficiency.  The  quadratic  term  accounts  for  nonlinearities  as  the  effect  of  growth  may  be 
different for aggressively growing banks. On the country level, we use a HHI to control for the 
effect of market structure. Recent work by Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Schaeck et al. 
(2009) has shown that concentration cannot be considered as a proxy for competition. Rather, 
concentration  has  independent  effects  on  performance  outcomes  in  the  banking  industry. 
Thus, while the Boone indicator captures competition, we control for market structure with 
the HHI. Since we compare Herfindahl indices across different markets, we also include total 
banking system assets (log) to account for the size of the systems (Breshanan, 1989). Finally, we 
include a time trend to capture the gradual nature of changes in the regulatory environment. 
The time trend is calculated as the current year minus the start date of the sampling period.  
For the U.S., we estimate a modified version of Eq. (7) based on OLS and 2SLS. In these 
regressions, explanatory variables are lagged by one period. 
Bank soundness and the Boone indicator 
We  use  the  Boone  indicator  to  establish  how  competition  impacts  on  soundness,  and 
estimate a general class of panel data models of the form 
ijt jt ijt jt ijt Z B X C α β γ δ ε = + + + +  ,            (8) 
where Zijt is a measure of bank soundness for bank i in country j at time t, Bjt is the Boone 
indicator in country j at time t, and X and C are vectors of bank- and country-specific variables. 
For Europe, the vector C includes country dummies. All explanatory variables are lagged by 
one period unless stated otherwise. If we find a negative sign for the Boone indicatorβ , we - 15 - 
 
can  interpret  this  as  direct  evidence  that  the  reallocation  effect  of  profits  from  inefficient 
banks to efficient ones contributes to sound banking activities. 
To measure soundness, we use the Z-score, calculated as  




=  ,                (9) 
 where ROA is return on assets, E/A denotes the equity to asset ratio and  ROA σ  is the 
standard deviation of return on assets. In the European sample, we use a three-year rolling 
time window for the  ROA σ  to allow for variation in the denominator of the Z-score. For the 
U.S. sample we use quarterly data from Call Reports, and also base our Z-scores on a rolling 
window estimate for three years.  This approach avoids that the Z-scores are exclusively driven 
by variation in the levels of capital and profitability.   
The Z-score combines banks’ buffers (capital and profits) with the risks they face (measured 
by the standard deviation of returns). It can be shown that the Z-score measures the number of 
standard deviations a return realization has to fall in order to deplete equity. A higher Z-score 
implies  a  lower  probability  of  insolvency,  providing  a  direct  measure  of  soundness  that  is 
superior to, e.g., analyzing leverage.    
We use total assets (log) to control for size as larger banks are frequently subject to too-big-
to-fail policies. The adaptation of these policies has been reflected in several bailouts of banks 
in  Europe  and  in  the  U.S.  Asset  growth  is  included  to  account  for  differences  in  risk 
preferences. To consider the fact that better diversified banks are assumed to be less risky, we 
control for diversification, measured by a diversification index (Laeven and Levine, 2007).
14 
We use the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets as a measure of asset quality. The HHI is 
included  to  reflect  on  research  indicating  that  concentration  and  competition  measure 
different  characteristics  of  banking  systems.  We  use  total  banking  system  assets  (log)  to 
consider  the  effect  of  market  size.  GDP  per  capita  (log)  and  unemployment  adjust  our 




                                                 







.  - 16 - 
 
4. Empirical Results 
We present the results from the link between competition and efficiency in Section 4.1. 
The relation between the Boone indicator and bank risk is examined in Section 4.2 for the 
European sample and in Section 4.3 for the U.S. sample.  
We  use  different  estimation  techniques,  including  2SLS  estimators  to  adjust  for 
endogeneity between measures of competition and soundness. Standard errors are clustered at 
the  bank  level.
15  To  examine  allow  for  heterogeneous  responses  of  banks  to  increases  in 
competition, we also estimate a set of two-stage quantile regressions.  
4.1 The relation between competition and efficiency 
We show the empirical associations between the Boone indicator and efficiency in Table 3. 
Panel A reports the results for Europe, and Panel B presents the findings for the U.S. 
Column (1) and (2) use panel data models with fixed effects and suggest that competition 
increases  cost  efficiency.  However,  we  are  concerned  that  competition  and  efficiency  are 
endogenous because the direction of causality is ex-ante not clear. On one hand, competition is 
commonly perceived to provide incentives to increase efficiency. On the other hand, more 
efficient banks may compete more aggressively. To rectify this issue, we employ a two stage 
estimator using lagged values of Financial Freedom, and lagged values of an interaction term 
between market share and loan growth as instruments for the Boone indicator in column (3) 
and (4). The Financial  Freedom index is an excellent instrument for the Boone  indicator 
because  state  ownership  and  interference  are  frequently  considered  to  affect  competition. 
Moreover, the analysis in Table 2 shows a strong correlation between the index and the Boone 
indicator. We use the interaction term of the bank’s market share with loan growth because it 
increases whenever market share or loan growth or both increase. Such increases signal a more 
aggressively competing institution, and rapid growth of one individual bank can be expected to 
affect the competitive nature of the relevant market.  
The Boone indicator enters again significantly negatively. We use a Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test to verify whether the two-step estimator is warranted and whether our instruments satisfy 
the  exclusion  restrictions.  The  test  rejects  the  exogeneity  of  the  Boone  indicator.  The 
Anderson test verifies the relevance of our instruments and we also pass the Hansen test. 
[TABLE 3] 
                                                 
15   In unreported regressions we reestimate our models by clustering the errors on the country level for Europe 
and on the county level for the U.S. The results remain unchanged and can be obtained upon request. - 17 - 
 
The results in Panel B provide additional evidence for a beneficial effect of competition on 
cost efficiency based on U.S. data. Using OLS and 2SLS (we use an interaction term of loan 
growth and market share, and population (log) on the county level instead of the Financial 
Freedom Index as instruments), the indicator remains significantly negatively associated with 
efficiency. Thus, these findings support the notion that competition improves cost efficiency. 
In  the  remainder  of  the  study,  we  build  on  this  assumption  and  model  the  effect  of 
competition through the efficiency channel on soundness. 
4.2 Competition, efficiency, and soundness: European sample 
We  estimate  panel  data  models  with  fixed  effects  in  columns  (1)  and  (2)  in  Table  4. 
Column (1) contains bank-specific variables, controls for characteristics of the banking systems, 
and a time trend. The negative sign at the one percent level for the Boone indicator strongly 
supports the positive link between competition, efficiency, and soundness, and underscores 
that competition increases banks’ Z-scores via the efficiency channel.  
[TABLE 4] 
In column (2), we incorporate GDP per capita (log) and the unemployment rate. The effect 
of the Boone indicator increases. Our results also indicate that banks operate with lower Z-
scores in concentrated banking systems. This finding captures a pure and independent effect 
arising  from  market  structure  in  regressions  that  are  already  adjusted  for  the  level  of 
competition.  We  believe  that  the  inverse  relation  between  the  HHI  and  the  dependent 
variable suggests that banks in more concentrated systems are more likely to be considered too-
big-to-fail. Such institutions can afford to operate in a less sound manner. Consequently, these 
banks operate at lower capital ratios than would be appropriate given their risk profiles. 
We also find that size and loan loss provisioning are negatively related to Z-scores. The 
diversification index also enters negatively, indicating that Z-scores decrease in diversification.  
We  remain  concerned  that  the  Boone  indicator  is  endogenous  because  more  fragile 
institutions may ‘gamble for resurrection’ by increasing risk via the origination of risky loans, 
which by itself can be interpreted as a sign of increased competition.    
To address these concerns, we use a 2SLS estimator, and use again Financial Freedom, and 
an interaction term of market share and loan growth as instruments for the Boone indicator. 
The indicator remains significantly negative and increases in magnitude in Columns (3) and 
(4) in Table 4, indicating a bias in our previous estimates. We use the Durbin-Wu-Hausman - 18 - 
 
test to compare the estimates obtained from the fixed-effects model with the estimates from 
the 2SLS estimator. All test statistics are significant and reject the exogeneity of the indicator, 
confirming that an instrumental variable approach is necessary.   
Heterogeneous responses to competition   
To better understand what drives the hypothesized mechanism, we perform additional tests. 
First  examine  if  organizational  form  with  its  implications  for  different  types  of  lending 
technologies  matters  for  the  effect  of  competition.  The  intuition  behind  this  test  is  that 
competition incentivizes banks to specialize in certain lending technologies (Zarutskie, 2009). 
To capture organizational form as a proxy for different types of lending technologies, we use 
bank size because Berger et al. (2005) have shown that small banks primarily lend to opaque 
borrowers and specialize in processing soft information. In contrast, Berger et al. (2005) show 
that large banks originate loans on the grounds of easily verifiable hard information. Following 
this line of reasoning, we use the median bank size (407 m EUR) as a cut-off point, and focus 
in this analysis on the magnitude of the coefficient of the Boone indicator. The regression 
setup  is  identical  to  Column  (4).  Column  (5)  and  (6)  show  that  the  indicator  remains 
negatively and significantly associated with the Z-score, and the effect for the small banks is 
almost twice as large as for the bigger institutions. This result suggests that small banks adjust 
their  soundness  more  than  large  banks  in  response  to  competition.  The  effect  may  be 
attributable to greater flexibility in processing soft information relative to the larger banks, and 
lends  some  support  to  the  idea  in  Zarutskie  (2009)  that  small  banks  become  better  at 
identifying high quality loans because competition provides incentives to specialize.  
Second, we focus on the three different components of the Z-score to establish whether the 
beneficial effect of competition on soundness is primarily attributable to effects of competition 
on  capitalization,  profitability,  or  on  the  volatility  of  profits.  Columns  (7)  –  (9)  show  the 
results. These tests reveal an inverse relation of the Boone indicator with all three components 
of the Z-score, yet only the coefficients in the regressions with the capital ratio and ROA 
assume significance at conventional levels with similar magnitudes of their coefficients. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that competition, via the efficiency channel, principally drives - 19 - 
 
Z-scores higher via incentives to hold higher capital ratios, and via the reallocation of profits. 
The latter result illustrates nicely the intuition behind the Boone indicator.
16  
Third,  we  use  quantile  regression  to  allow  for  further  heterogeneous  responses  to 
competition (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) in Table 5. The intuition is as follows: Particularly 
weak banks, i.e., banks with low Z-scores may respond in a different way to competition than 
do sound banks. Such varying effects indicate that more than one single slope parameter is 
necessary to describe the relation between competition and soundness. This situation calls for 
the use of quantile regression because it permits inferences about the impact of regressors 
conditional on the distribution of the measure of soundness.
17   
[TABLE 5] 
Since we remain cautious about endogeneity of the Boone indicator, we use a two-stage 
quantile estimator (Amemiya, 1982). First, we regress the Boone indicator on the interaction 
term  of  the  bank’s  market  share  and  loan  growth,  Financial  Freedom  and  the  exogenous 
variables. In the second stage, we regress the Z-score on the predicted value for the Boone 
indicator and the exogenous variables. Since the standard errors from the second stage are 
incorrect, we use a bootstrapping procedure based on 1,000 replications to correct them.
18  
Our  supposition  that  the  transmission  mechanism  from  competition  via  the  efficiency 
channel on soundness depends on the soundness of the banks in question is confirmed in the 
quantile  regression  analysis.  Table  5  reports  the  coefficients  obtained  with  the  two-stage 




th, and the 90
th quantile of 
the distribution of the  Z-score. To illustrate the effect of  a one-unit change of the Boone 
indicator  on  soundness  with  the  other  covariates  held  constant,  we  plot  in  Figure  3  the 
quantile  regression  estimates  as  a  solid  curve.  The  vertical  axis  indicates  the  effect  of 
competition and the horizontal line represents the quantile scale. The grey area shows a 95 
percent confidence interval for the quantile regression and the dashed line represents the OLS 
estimator and the concurrent confidence interval.  
                                                 
16   The positive effect of competition on bank capital holdings is fully in line with theoretical predictions in 
Allen et al. (forthcoming), and the closely related empirical evidence in Schaeck and Cihak (forthcoming).  
17   We note two important differences between quantile regression and OLS. First, quantile regression provides 
information  about  the  slope  at  different  points  of  the  dependent  variable  given  the  set  of  explanatory 
variables, whereas OLS provides information about the slope at different points of the explanatory variables. 
Second,  least  absolute  deviation  estimation  is  more  robust  to  departures  from  normality,  because  linear 
estimators are more likely to produce inefficient estimates.  
18   Appendix III provides technical details for the derivation and estimation of the quantile regressions. - 20 - 
 
[FIGURE 3] 
The coefficient of competition remains negative and significant across the quantiles. The 
quantile regressions offer additional insights. Figure 3 highlights departures from the previous 
estimates of the Boone indicator at the upper and the lower tails of the distribution of the Z-
score. The inference from the visual inspection is also validated when we use an F-Test to check 
if the coefficients of the Boone indicator are equal across all quantiles. Our F-Test rejects the 
null  hypothesis  for  the  equality  of  the  coefficients.  This  suggests  that  relying  on  a  single 
measure of central tendency may be insufficient to evaluate the effect of competition.  
Our result highlights that policymakers need to consider that any competition increasing 
policy  may  differently  affect  soundness  in  the  relevant  banking  market  depending  on  the 
health  of  the  banks.  Second,  the  increasing  magnitude  of  the  coefficient  of  the  Boone 
indicator underscores that banks at the lower tail of the distribution of the Z-score benefit less 
from competition. This is intuitive. A fragile institution is likely to have a low capital ratio, 
lower and more volatile profits, and is likely to operate at higher costs. Such an institution will 
find it harder to survive increases in competition than more efficient banks.     
Robustness tests 
We perform robustness checks in Appendix IV, Panel A. First, we use the aggregate ratio 
of non-performing loans to total loans on the country level as a dependent variable to check if 
measurement issues drive the significant association of the Z-score with the Boone indicator. 
This  analysis  shows  a  positive  association  of  the  Boone  indicator  with  the  level  of  non-
performing loans, confirming that competition contributes to soundness, also on the systemic 
level. Further, we separately re-run the regressions for commercial, savings, and cooperative 
banks, and use an estimation procedure that assigns less weight to observations where the 
indicator is estimated with greater variance to account for the fact that the Boone indicator is 
derived from a regression. Finally, we test whether industry composition and survivorship bias 
affect our findings, and we also adjust the regressions for the fact that the Z-score is truncated. 
All tests confirm the validity of our previous inferences. 
4.3 Competition, efficiency, and soundness: U.S. sample 
We examine the U.S. sample in Table 6. The regressions are identical to those for Europe 
in terms of the control variables except that we replace GDP per capita with personal income 
due to data availability and the absence of country dummies. Columns (1) and (2) use OLS, - 21 - 
 
and columns (3) and (4) are estimated with 2SLS to account for endogeneity between the 
Boone indicator and soundness. Columns (5) - (6) run the tests separately for small and large 
banks, and Column (7) – (9) show results for the components of the Z-score.  
[TABLE 6] 
The indicator confirms our inferences for the soundness enhancing effect of competition in 
column (1), although it remains insignificant in column (2). However, when we turn to 2SLS, 
our earlier results are reinforced, and the significant Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistics suggest 
that the 2SLS estimator is more appropriate.
20 
The analysis of local banking markets in the U.S. yields a further insight. The HHI does not 
confirm our results for Europe. The HHI enters only in a few regressions with a negative and 
significant sign, indicating that that our argument about ‘too-big-to-fail’ policies does not hold 
for the U.S. This observation is intuitive: First, the sample consists exclusively of single-market 
banks that are far from being subject too-big-to-fail policies. Second, regulatory authorities in 
the U.S. have shown greater propensity to allow banks, including larger institutions, to fail.    
Heterogeneous responses to competition   
We perform again the three additional tests mentioned above to better understand the 
hypothesized transmission mechanism.  
In the first test, we split the sample banks at the median bank size (104 m USD) to focus on 
organizational form as a proxy for different lending technologies. Column (5) and (6) in Table 
6 confirm the findings for Europe that smaller banks’ Z-scores benefit more than larger banks’ 
Z-scores from competition.  
The remaining columns show the results for the components of the Z-score. We find again 
a significantly negative relation of the Boone indicator with the capital ratio and with ROA, 
whereas the volatility of profits is significantly positively associated with the Boone indicator. 
This positive association between profit volatility is however not strong enough to dominate 
the negative link between the indicator and the capital ratio and ROA.   
We  report  quantile  regression  results  in  Table  7.  However,  since  quantile  regression 
requires large sample sizes, we do not assign too much weight to these results, merely reporting 
                                                 
20   The magnitude of the coefficients of the Boone indicator for the U.S. sample is considerably smaller than in 
the regressions for the European banks. While this result may partially reflect a greater degree of heterogeneity 
of banks in the European sample, we believe it also offers some indication that the mechanism in Europe is 
more prevalent than in rural banking markets in the U.S.  - 22 - 
 
them  for  completeness.
21  The  two-stage  quantile  regression  estimator  encounters  inference 
problems due to the small sample size. The coefficient for the indicator remains negative, and 
is significant at the 10
th, at the 75
th, and at the 90
th quantile. In a similar vein to the results for 
the European sample, the magnitude of the coefficient increases considerably for the sound 
banks located at the upper tail of the distribution, suggesting again heterogeneous effects.  
[TABLE 7] 
Figure 4 illustrates the behavior of the coefficient of the indicator. The trend of the slope 
coefficients resembles the pattern for the European sample in that sense that we observe an 
increase in terms of the magnitude of the effect towards the upper tail of the distribution, and 
the quantile regression estimates also depart significantly from the linear predictions. The F-
Test rejects the hypothesis for the equality of coefficients across the quantiles, lending more 
support to the idea that competition affects soundness in a heterogeneous manner.  
[FIGURE 4] 
Robustness tests 
We run robustness tests for the U.S, and use the aggregate level of non-performing loans to 
total loans on the county level as an alternative dependent variable, account for the generated 
regressor problem, and adjust for the truncated nature of the Z-score. These checks leave our 
key result unchanged (Appendix IV, Panel B).   
5. Conclusion 
We inform the debate about how competition contributes to bank soundness as argued in 
recent studies. Specifically, we propose that competition incentivizes banks to enhance cost 
efficiency,  and  that  competition  rewards  successful  banks  by  reallocating  profits  from 
inefficient ones to more efficient institutions. In other words, the underlying idea is a stylized 
picture of competition: Banks with strong performance will pass a market test and survive 
whereas weak institutions will shrink, sell out, and exit the market. Based on this conjecture, 
we formulate and  test hypotheses that allow examining the transmission mechanism from 
competition via the efficiency channel to bank soundness.   
We use an innovative measure of competition, the Boone indicator, which is based on the 
idea of analyzing cost elasticity of performance by capturing the link between competition and 
                                                 
21   Note  that  quantile  regression  effectively  fits  a  line  for  each  conditional  quantile.  This  means  that  the 
observations  that  do  not  belong  to  the  particular  conditional  quantile  receive  a  small  weight  in  the 
optimization algorithm. As a result standard inference problems are present in particularly small datasets.  - 23 - 
 
efficiency. To test our hypothesis, we first establish the effect of competition on efficiency, and 
subsequently relate the Boone indicator to measures of bank soundness.  
Using panel data for Europe, and a sample for single-market banks operating in the U.S., 
we show in an initial analysis that the new measure of competition captures over 80 percent in 
the variation of many other features of banking competition in Europe, suggesting that the 
Boone indicator is able to comprehensively capture characteristics of competition. Next, we 
establish evidence for the assumption that competition increases efficiency. Building on this, 
we then present robust evidence for a positive link between competition and soundness via 
efficiency. Specifically, when we decompose the Z-score into its components to observe the 
mechanism  in  greater  detail,  we  show  that  profitability  is  positively  associated  with 
competition. A final set of tests focuses on banks’ heterogeneous responses to competition. 
Here, we find that smaller banks’ soundness measures respond more strongly to competition. 
This finding can be interpreted as suggestive evidence that they tend to specialize in more 
competitive environments which we attribute to their better ability to process soft information 
loans.  Using  quantile  regressions,  we  show  that  weak  banks,  in  terms  of  their  soundness, 
benefit less from competition than do sound institutions.  
Two caveats apply.  First, our investigation does not account for contagion among banks 
arising from the failure of inefficient institutions. The recent crisis has shown that banks are 
interconnected via credit derivatives in a way that is difficult to trace. Since testing for such 
effects is beyond the scope of the present analysis, we view our study as a partial equilibrium 
analysis. Second, the findings for the U.S. are obtained for a non-representative sample of 
single-market banks.  
Our results have implications for policymaking in banking. First, promoting competition 
does seem to have benefits for efficiency and soundness. Second, the findings obtained with 
quantile  regression  suggest  that  policymakers  need  to  consider  that  any  action  that  raises 
competition in banking can affect the soundness of the institutions in the relevant banking 
market in a heterogeneous way.   
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We report the estimates of the Boone indicator based on average costs with ROA as dependent variable, adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The estimates are obtained using a two-step GMM 
panel data estimator with bank-fixed effects whereby we employ one-year lagged values of the explanatory variables as instruments. All regressions have considerable explanatory power; we 








Panel A: Europe  
  Austria  Belgium  Denmark  France  Italy  Germany  Luxembourg  Netherlands  Switzerland  United Kingdom 
Year  Boone   t-value  Boone  t-value  Boone   t-value  Boone   t-value  Boone  t-value  Boone   t-value  Boone   t-value  Boone   t-value  Boone   t-value  Boone   t-value 
1996  -0.059  -2.431  -0.048  -3.015  -0.051  -3.643  -0.014  -1.228  -0.079  -13.793  -0.037  -15.287  -0.037  -6.288  -0.130  -2.550  -0.060  -4.282  -0.100  -7.420 
1997  -0.038  -2.590  -0.052  -3.216  -0.034  -2.231  -0.012  -0.837  -0.067  -11.481  -0.033  -13.469  -0.034  -6.312  -0.082  -1.533  -0.063  -5.452  -0.093  -9.295 
1998  -0.037  -2.304  -0.055  -3.781  -0.030  -2.244  -0.019  -1.626  -0.058  -13.082  -0.029  -10.543  -0.039  -5.079  -0.067  -1.459  -0.069  -6.381  -0.090  -8.477 
1999  -0.034  -2.424  -0.057  -3.986  -0.018  -1.331  -0.025  -2.240  -0.042  -8.945  -0.026  -8.519  -0.027  -6.370  -0.095  -1.933  -0.061  -5.608  -0.081  -7.571 
2000  -0.036  -3.123  -0.066  -4.131  -0.035  -2.565  -0.024  -2.470  -0.045  -11.366  -0.021  -6.940  -0.045  -7.671  -0.123  -2.749  -0.076  -6.648  -0.081  -7.508 
2001  -0.034  -2.474  -0.055  -3.414  -0.022  -1.546  -0.025  -2.644  -0.043  -10.033  -0.016  -5.026  -0.033  -6.145  -0.098  -1.843  -0.070  -4.885  -0.070  -6.622 
2002  -0.028  -2.183  -0.059  -3.426  -0.024  -1.725  -0.020  -2.310  -0.039  -8.236  -0.015  -5.409  -0.030  -4.440  -0.059  -1.517  -0.063  -4.525  -0.066  -6.041 
2003  -0.026  -2.315  -0.053  -3.473  -0.045  -3.357  -0.019  -2.509  -0.036  -8.205  -0.019  -7.675  -0.024  -5.053  -0.061  -1.100  -0.059  -4.498  -0.062  -7.652 
2004  -0.029  -2.646  -0.047  -3.567  -0.035  -2.635  -0.024  -3.210  -0.037  -9.171  -0.017  -7.727  -0.026  -6.196  -0.030  -0.716  -0.053  -4.160  -0.082  -5.221 
2005  -0.030  -2.890  -0.048  -3.849  -0.042  -3.416  -0.023  -3.064  -0.039  -9.155  -0.024  -10.302  -0.028  -8.000  -0.064  -1.791  -0.053  -4.704  -0.056  -4.754 
Observations  1074  282    480    1631    3145    12670    625    97    1642    346 
R
2  0.1267    0.5764    0.3833    0.1295    0.4339    0.3433    0.3997    0.4674    0.2287    0.3204 
Anderson cor.  22.063**  17.911*  188.527***  79.951***  730.112***  3750.837***  88.536***  19.902**  74.773***  76.845*** Panel B: U.S. (local markets)   
County  State  Boone  t-value  N  R
2  Anderson corr.  Hansen J-Test 
Adams  IL  -0.013  -3.777  33  0.641  5.428*  1.572 
Benton  IA  -0.016  -2.701  21  0.132  17.568***  0.052 
Bremer  IA  -0.010  -4.867  27  0.222  13.307***  0.519 
Brown  MN  -0.063  -0.808  23  0.208  1.860  0.111 
Buffalo  NE  -0.022  -0.457  21  0.231  2.706  0.816 
Caddo  OK  -0.017  -2.404  21  0.599  3.129  0.147 
Carroll  IA  -0.010  -4.546  23  0.711  9.202**  1.171 
Christian  IL  -0.001  -0.735  24  0.221  5.214*  3.428* 
Clayton  IA  -0.007  -1.059  21  0.555  0.680  0.060 
Cole  MO  -0.007  -2.867  21  0.556  15.864***  0.149 
Dodge  WI  -0.010  -1.621  21  0.783  1.397  0.715 
Faribault  MN  -0.033  -0.445  24  0.106  0.430  0.001 
Fayette  TX  -0.007  -1.492  21  0.453  1.198  0.000 
Goodhue  MN  -0.012  -4.182  21  0.873  2.326  0.001 
Grant  WI  -0.018  -2.961  24  0.327  6.629**  1.258 
Hancock  IL  -0.008  -1.642  26  0.538  6.602**  1.649 
Iroquois  IL  -0.013  -4.271  34  0.692  2.357  0.794 
Jackson  IL  -0.011  -6.439  21  0.697  7.936**  0.245 
Jefferson  WI  -0.012  -3.267  24  0.569  20.462***  2.609 
Kandiyohi  MN  -0.006  -2.419  29  0.297  3.599  0.095 
Lee  IA  -0.031  -0.991  20  0.700  0.702  0.276 
Litchfield  CT  -0.003  -0.695  26  0.380  0.363  0.100 
Livingston  IL  -0.007  -1.201  33  0.435  1.075  0.486 
Lyon  KS  -0.013  -11.053  21  0.939  9.405***  0.003 
Macoupin  IL  -0.006  -1.476  24  0.684  3.157  3.320* 
Marshall  KS  -0.034  -1.154  18  0.363  11.971***  0.109 
Martin  MN  -0.020  -4.783  30  0.753  2.207  0.260 
McPherson  KS  -0.011  -2.281  21  0.757  1.765  1.447 
Medina  TX  -0.021  -2.366  21  0.457  10.367***  0.145 
Montgomery  IL  -0.016  -1.596  27  0.941  1.840  1.320 
Mower  MN  -0.018  -5.709  18  0.577  9.821***  0.018 
Randolph  IL  -0.004  -1.333  21  0.384  1.238  0.6647 
Saunders  NE  -0.012  -2.180  33  0.862  11.003***  0.114 
Sioux  IA  -0.009  -3.814  27  0.584  8.221**  0.002 
Stephenson  IL  -0.013  -5.338  30  0.624  12.292***  0.5840 
Story  IA  -0.003  -0.898  26  0.170  2.461  1.355 
Sumner  KS  -0.011  -5.013  30  0.844  6.895**  0.552 
Trempealeau  WI  -0.010  -1.073  23  0.283  2.313  1.895 
Vermilion  LA  -0.010  -2.855  21  0.727  4.460  0.024 
Vermilion  IL  -0.012  -2.981  26  0.596  5.201*  1.910 
Vernon  WI  -0.022  -1.458  20  0.302  1.893  0.051 
Wood  WI  -0.009  -6.258  21  0.748  9.971***  1.340 
We report the estimates of the Boone indicator based on average costs with ROA as dependent variable, adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity. The estimates are obtained using a two-step GMM estimator with one and two year lagged 
values  of  the  explanatory  variables  as  instruments  based  on  the  following  specification:  
    =    +   ln      +    . The regressions have considerable explanatory power. We additionally present the 
Anderson canonical correlation coefficient for the excluded instruments, and the Hansen J-Test for instrument 
exogeneity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 - 28 - 
 
Appendix II: Measuring and estimating cost efficiency  
For  the  analysis  of  efficiency,  we  focus  on  the  concept  of  cost  efficiency  because  the 
intuition behind the Boone indicator is to analyze cost elasticity of bank performance. Cost 
efficiency measures how close the bank’s cost is to the best practice bank’s cost if it would 
produce the same output bundle under the same conditions (Berger and Mester, 1997). We 
write a bank’s cost function as 
ln C = f(w,y,e)+ln uc + lnεc              (A.1) 
where C measures variable cost. The price vector of the inputs is denoted by w, and the 
vector of output quantities is captured by y. E indicates the quantities of any fixed netputs 
(inputs or outputs), uc denotes an inefficiency term that raises cost above the level of the best-
practice bank, and  c is the remaining random disturbance. Cost efficiency ranges between 0 
and 1, whereby larger values indicate greater cost efficiency.  
To  estimate  cost  efficiency,  we  use  stochastic  frontier  techniques  that  allow  us  to 
decompose the error term into two parts, one term captures random disturbance and follows 
a  symmetric  normal  distribution.  The  second  part  of  the  error  captures  inefficiency, 
following a positive half-normal distribution. The frontier functions are estimated for each 
country separately. We follow the intermediation approach and use a translog functional 
form with two outputs and specify 
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C is our measure of cost. Output quantities (loans and other earning assets) are denoted by 
Y, W is the vector of inputs (labor, funding, and other costs), and netputs (fixed assets, loan 
loss provisions, and equity) are represented by the vector E. To impose standard homogeneity - 29 - 
 
conditions, we scale all costs and input prices by one other input price (labor costs), and 
adjust for heteroskedasticity and scale biases by scaling by one of the netputs (equity capital).  
Efficiency scores  
Panel A: European sample  Panel B: U.S. sample 
  Obs  Mean  Min  Max  Obs  Mean  Min  Max 
Cost efficiency  17965  0.95  0.164  1.00  382  0.83  0.186  1.00 
 
The table suggests that banks in Europe and in local markets in the U.S. operate close to 
their efficiency frontier. The average European bank loses about 5 percent due to inefficiency 
whereas single-market banks in the U.S. lose 17 percent.  
 - 30 - 
 
Appendix III: Two-stage least absolute deviation estimator (2SLAD) 
Quantile regression is appropriate in instances, where characteristics in the data suggest 
that more than one single slope parameter is necessary to describe the relation between the 
dependent variable and the regressors. If we assume that fragile banks respond differently to 
competition than do sound institutions, a case may be made to focus the analysis on the tails 
of the distribution of the dependent variable. Quantile regression permits inferences about 
the  impact  of  regressors  conditional  on  the  distribution  of  the  soundness  variable  as  it 
provides information about the slope at different points of the dependent variable. Thus, 
whereas classical linear regression estimates conditional mean functions, quantile regression 
estimates conditional quantile functions, i.e., models in which quantiles of the dependent 
variable are expressed as functions of a set of explanatory variables.
22  
Similarly  to  the  widely  used  two-stage  least  squares  estimator,  we  can  obtain  quantile 
estimates for a model with endogenous variables with the two-stage least absolute deviation 
estimator (2SLAD). Amemiya (1982) defines a class of estimators called the two-stage least 
absolute deviation estimators, and he also derived their asymptotic properties. In his article, 
he points how we can derive the least absolute deviation estimator that is analogue of 2SLS 
in the estimation of C  in a structural equation and a reduced form as given below  
E ZC E XB YA + = + + and  








.        (B.1) 
Amemiya (1982) highlights that all previous studies relating to the subject define LAD as 
the value of C that minimized   
∑ ′ − = ZC P Y Sa 1 1  , where  X X X X P ′ ′ =
−1 ) (         (B.2) 
Theil (1961) interpreted 2SLS so as to minimize  ∑ ′ − =
2
1 1 ) ( ZC P Y SL . However, if we 
intend to use an interpretation of 2SLS as the instrumental variable estimator minimizing
2
1 ) ( ZC P Y P S L ′ − ′ =∑ ,  we  can  define  2SLAD  analogously  to  minimize
                                                 
22   Quantiles divide the cumulative distribution function of a random variable into a number of equally sized 
segments. Quantiles are the general case of splitting a population into segments. For instance, quartiles divide 
a population into four segments, with equal proportions of the reference population in each segment.  - 31 - 
 
∑ ′ − ′ = ZC P Y P S A 1 .  Combining  the  above  two  ideas,  2SLAD  is  a  class  of  estimators 
obtained by minimizing  
∑ ′ − ′ − + = ZC P Y P q qY SqA ) 1 (             (B.3) 
where q is the parameter to be determined by the researcher. The parameter q determines the 
point of the distribution of the dependent variable. The minimization of  
     { } ∑ ′ − ′ − + =
2 ) 1 ( ZC P Y P q qY SqL             (B.4) 
yields  2SLS  for  any  value  of  q  whereas  the  minimization  of  its  absolute  analogue        
depends crucially on the value of q. If q =0, it yields the estimator which is asymptotically 
equivalent  to  2SLS.  As  a  result,  in  the  asymptotic  sense  the  class  of  2SLAD  estimator 
contains 2SLS as a special case. Given the standard regression model, Y = Xa+E where X is a 
  ×   matrix of bounded constants such that  ) ( lim
1 X X n ′
−
∞ →  is a finite positive-definite 
matrix and E is a n-vector of i.i.d random variables, the LAD estimator has been defined to 
be a value of     that minimizes ∑ ∑
= =





i i i E a X Y S
1 1
ˆ , where  1 X ′ is the 
th i  row of X. The 
second term of the right- hand side of the equation does not affect the minimization since it 
is  independent  of     .  It  is  added  to  facilitate  proof  of  consistency  without  assuming  the 
existence  of  a  finite  first  moment.  Amemiya  (1982)  proves  the  consistency  of  LAD  by 
showing that  −1  converges almost surely uniformly in     to a function which attains the 
minimum at  , the true value. Strong consistency of 2SLAD for any value of q>0 follows 
from the consistency of LAD.    
In the 2SLAD estimation, it is assumed that the minimization of the sum of absolute 
deviation is applied only to a specific equation to be estimated and not to the reduced form 
equation. In other words, LAD is applied only in the second stage of regression and not in 
the first. The first stage is based on OLS. Since the standard errors from the second stage are 
incorrect,  we  bootstrap  the  whole  system  of  equations  to  account  for  the  fact  that  the 





































In column (1), we use the level of non-performing loans to total loans on the country level as dependent variable (obtained from International Financial Statistics). Column (2), (3), and (4) constrain the 
sample to commercial, savings, and cooperative banks respectively. In column (5), we use the inverse of the variance of the Boone indicator as a weight to account for the generated regressor problem. 
Columns (6) and (7) adjust our sample for industry composition. We constrain the sample to banks that do not exit the dataset during the entire sampling period in column (6), whereas column (7) excludes 
banks that exit the market at any point in time. In column (8) we use a two-stage Tobit model. All models use an interaction term of market share and loan growth, and Financial Freedom as instruments for 
the Boone indicator. Robust z statistics in parentheses, all standard errors are clustered on the bank level. Explanatory variables lagged by one period unless stated otherwise. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
Panel A: European sample         
Estimator    Two-stage least squares    Two-stage Tobit 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 












Banks in sample 
during entire 
sampling period 





Bank-specific variables                 
Total assets (log)  0.235***  -0.325***  -0.173***  -0.175***  -0.282***  -0.142***  -0.244***  -0.0258*** 
  (2.67)  (-8.75)  (-7.76)  (-12.8)  (-9.49)  (-6.5907)  (-13.6200)  (-6.73) 
Asset growth  0.0848  -0.111***  0.0109  0.0331***  -0.0489*  -0.0218  -0.00209  -0.0975*** 
  (1.39)  (-4.76)  (0.78)  (4.00)  (-1.82)  (-1.1658)  (-0.1573)  (-4.37) 
Diversification index  -1.590***  -0.727***  -0.539***  -0.467***  -0.602***  -0.603***  -0.580***  -0.829*** 
  (-4.78)  (-6.15)  (-9.62)  (-10.2)  (-6.59)  (-8.6622)  (-11.5962)  (-14.4) 
Loan loss provisions/Total assets  6.217**  -3.052***  -7.716***  -3.926***  -3.374***  -4.878***  -4.038***  -10.89** 
  (2.29)  (-2.59)  (-9.65)  (-8.82)  (-3.17)  (-7.3576)  (-6.0544)  (-2.46) 
Country-specific variables                 
Herfindahl Hirschman index  -1.071  -0.588***  -0.0986  0.791  -0.473***  -0.263**  -0.270**  -1.972*** 
  (-0.47)  (-4.07)  (-0.70)  (1.41)  (-5.79)  (-1.9606)  (-2.3604)  (-6.81) 
Banking system assets (log)  -0.0421*  0.0292***  0.0646***  0.00106  0.0418***  0.00271  0.0138***  -0.0400*** 
  (-1.80)  (3.19)  (5.68)  (0.22)  (7.11)  (0.3639)  (3.4770)  (-7.14) 
GDP per capita (log, t-2)  0.381  0.567*  -0.507  1.835***  0.00557  0.0438  0.840***  0.0160 
  (0.12)  (1.87)  (-1.59)  (3.70)  (0.027)  (0.1270)  (3.3257)  (0.26) 
Unemployment (t-2)  0.273***  -0.0238***  -0.0258***  0.0179***  -0.0329***  -0.00820*  0.00185  -0.00123 
  (5.55)  (-3.41)  (-4.79)  (4.55)  (-6.80)  (-1.8679)  (0.5726)  (-0.25) 
Competition indicator                 
Boone indicator   78.89***  -9.675***  -5.579***  -10.76***  -2.407*  -4.975***  -7.251***  -10.94*** 
  (2.68)  (-3.22)  (-5.99)  (-11.3)  (-1.91)  (-5.0625)  (-8.4433)  (-16.6) 
Time effect                 
Time trend  -0.0898**  0.0209***  0.0357***  0.0159**  0.0319***  0.0297***  0.0228***  0.0382*** 
  (-2.21)  (3.40)  (7.98)  (2.52)  (7.41)  (5.9928)  (5.6355)  (19.3) 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Observations  11450  2855  5628  9085  17568  6948  10620  17965 
Number of banks  2462  535  845  1548  2928  772  2156  3325 
R
2  0.3180  0.2305  0.3969  0.2870  0.3529  0.2950  0.2435  n/a 
Andersen Test χ
2   11.711***  66.008***  1107.133***  3489.431***  1312.030***  338.942***  485.193***  n/a 
Hansen J-Test χ
2  1.790  4.169**  0.360  0.610  0.138  7.815***  0.709  n/a 
Wald Test of exogeneity χ
2  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  17.53*** 




























In column (1), we use the level of non-performing loans to total loans on the country level as dependent variable (calculated by the authors). 
Column (2) and (3) use the Z-score (log) as dependent variable. We report 2SLS estimates in column (1) and (2) and use a Tobit 
model with instruments in column (3). As instruments we use county population (log), and an interaction term of market share and 
loan  growth  for  the  Boone  indicator.  Robust  t  statistics  in  parentheses.  Explanatory  variables  lagged  by  one  period  unless  stated 




Panel B: U.S. sample 
Estimator  Two-stage least squares  Two-stage Tobit  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Model setup  Aggregate Non-performing 
loans/Total loans 
Adjustment for generated regressor 
problem 
IV Tobit 
Bank specific-variables       
Total assets (log)  0.0001  0.309  -0.167 
  (0.3424)  (1.6214)  (-0.2671) 
Asset growth  0.0009  -0.664  -0.422 
  (0.5602)  (-0.7937)  (-0.4345) 
Diversification index  0.0038  -5.243***  -9.459* 
  (1.0867)  (-3.2276)  (-1.8125) 
Loan loss provisions/Total assets  -0.907  -551.0*  1431 
  (-0.8499)  (-1.8617)  (1.0725) 
Country-specific variables       
Herfindahl-Hirschman index  0.0011  -0.968*  1.325 
  (0.7893)  (-1.7068)  (1.0277) 
Total banking system assets (log)  0.0001  0.329  1.046 
  (0.3290)  (1.4443)  (1.0000) 
Personal income (log, t-2)  2.90e-08  -0.000190***  -0.000231** 
  (0.2780)  (-3.2178)  (-2.4626) 
Unemployment (t-2)  0.0002  -0.191**  1.139* 
  (0.7097)  (-2.0220)  (1.7544) 
Competition indicator       
Boone indicator  0.0027**  -2.564***  -4.519*** 
  (2.3658)  (-2.6265)  (-2.7588) 
Observations/Number of banks  382  382  382 
R
2  0.1170  n/a  n/a 
Anderson Test χ
2  9.205**  23.732***  n/a 
Hansen J-Test χ
2  3.735*  27.727***  n/a 
Wald test of exogeneity χ
2  n/a  n/a  8.04*** 
F-Test model χ
2/Wald model χ
2   42.65***  12.13***  38.48*** Table 1: Summary statistics 
Panel A: European data           
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Z-score  17965  29.596  22.859  5.201  257.506 
Total assets (TEUR)  17965  1374203  3636810  11131  113000000 
Total assets (log)  17965  13.156  1.308  9.317  18.542 
Asset growth  17965  0.069  0.221  -0.868  4.974 
Diversification index  17965  0.588  0.113  0.068  0.999 
Loan loss provisions/Total assets  17965  0.004  0.005  -0.058  0.438 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index  17965  0.006  0.019  0.000  0.206 
Total banking system assets (log)  17965  21.549  1.174  17.363  23.199 
GDP per capita  17965  23247.610  4697.686  17564.960  48837.730 
Unemployment   17965  0.082  0.024  0.002  0.123 
Boone indicator  17965  -0.030  0.015  -0.123  -0.012 
Financial Freedom  17965  60.376  13.723  50  90 
Loan growth  17965  0.084  0.307  -0.934  19.714 
Market share  17965  0.001  0.007  0.000  0.120 
 Panel B: U.S. data            
Z-score  382  49.024  95.651  0.773  564.980 
Total assets (TUSD)  382  64731  2.521  3261  1414095 
Total assets (log)  382  11.078  0.925  8.090  14.162 
Asset growth  382  0.052  0.187  -0.256  3.192 
Diversification index  382  0.488  0.094  0.078  0.916 
Loan loss provisions/Total assets  382  0.000  0.001  -0.002  0.004 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index  382  0.1691  0.1044  0.0878  0.8742 
Total banking system assets (log)  382  13.470  0.520  12.562  15.025 
Personal income    382  26767.580  3104.245  19940.000  38582.000 
Unemployment  382  5.480  1.418  2.800  8.700 
Boone indicator  382  -0.0141   0.0105  -0.063  -0.001 
Financial Freedom  382  90.000  0.000  90.000  90.000 
Loan growth  382  0.097  0.212  -0.270  3.422 
Market share  382  0.125  0.106  0.005  0.690 
  Table 2: Boone indicators and other characteristics of competition  
Panel A: European sample 














Austria  136  -0.031  1.583  0.022  0.070  0.057  0.522  70.8  0 
Belgium  29  -0.055  2.083  0  0.172  0.085  0.585  70  0 
Denmark  53  -0.031  2.250  0.079  0.361  0.069  0.310  77.9  0 
France  162  -0.021  1.750  0  0.537  0.090  0.430  50  0 
Germany  1388  -0.022  1.583  0  0.460  0.066  0.456  52.3  42.2 
Italy  410  -0.042  2.666  0.186  0.394  0.058  0.390  70  10 
Luxembourg  67  -0.032  1.750  0  0.026  0.310  0.855  79.3  5.05 
Netherlands  11  -0.073  1.500  0  1.207  0.095  0.970  90  3.9 
Switzerland  215  -0.062  1.666  0.004  1.895  0.119  0.591  90  14.12 
UK  43  -0.076  1.166  0  1.082  0.137  0.590  90  0 
Correlation  0.335  0.156  -0.666  -0.050  -0.521  -0.812  0.279 
R
2 (1)  0.112  0.024  0.443  0.003  0.272  0.660  0.078 
R
2 (2)  0.807 
We report mean values of the variables for the European countries in Panel A for 1995-2005. The H-Statistics are calculated by regressing the ratio of 
interest revenue to total assets on the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits (proxy for funding costs), personnel expenses to total assets (proxy for labor 
cost), administrative expenses to total assets (proxy for price of fixed capital), and control variables (loans to total assets, equity to total assets, bank size, and 
year dummies), whereby all financial variables enter the regression in logs. The insurance premiums/GDP are taken from the updated database provided by 
Beck et al. (2000). The Financial Freedom Index is obtained from the Heritage Foundation. The data for government ownership, the proportion of entry 
applications denied, and for activity restrictions are taken from the updated database provided by Barth et al. (2001). Entry denied is the ratio of the 
number of entry applications by domestic and foreign banks into the industry relative to total entry applications. Activity restrictions is an index that takes 
on values between 1 and 4 that provides information about whether banks can engage in securities, real estate, and insurance activities, and whether banks 
can hold stakes in non-financial firms. Larger values indicate more restrictions. We use the average value of the three surveys taken by Barth et al. (2001) for 
the calculations of the variables entry denied and activity restrictions. We present correlation coefficients between the Boone indicators and the other 
variables, and R
2 (1) OLS regression statistics of the Boone indicator on the respective variables to examine how much variation in the Boone indicator is 
explained by the other measures of market structure and competition. The final row presents the coefficient of determination R
2 (2) for an OLS regression 
of the Boone indicator on Activity restrictions, Entry denied, Stock market value/GDP, Insurance premiums/GDP, H-Statistic, Financial Freedom Index, 
and government ownership. 36 
 
Panel B: U.S. sample 
     
 
County  N  Boone indicator  H-Statistic  Branches/Population 
Adams, IL  11  -0.013  0.316  0.433 
Benton, IA  7  -0.016  0.274  0.267 
Bremer, IA  9  -0.010  0.376  0.639 
Brown, MN  8  -0.063  0.697  0.306 
Buffalo, NE  7  -0.022  0.339  0.249 
Caddo, OK  7  -0.017  0.262  0.807 
Carroll, IA  8  -0.010  0.307  1.003 
Christian, IL  8  -0.001  0.125  0.373 
Clayton, IA  7  -0.007  0.134  0.726 
Cole, MO  7  -0.007  0.193  0.220 
Dodge, WI  7  -0.010  0.163  0.194 
Faribault, MN  8  -0.033  0.146  0.593 
Fayette, TX  7  -0.007  0.157  1.566 
Goodhue, MN  7  -0.012  0.527  0.287 
Grant, WI  8  -0.018  0.355  0.468 
Hancock, IL  9  -0.008  0.306  0.838 
Iroquois, IL  11  -0.013  0.419  0.657 
Jackson, IL  7  -0.011  0.316  0.186 
Jefferson, WI  8  -0.012  0.337  0.228 
Kandiyohi, MN  10  -0.007  0.318  0.341 
Lee, IA  7  -0.031  0.353  0.608 
Litchfield, CT  9  -0.003  0.285  0.191 
Livingston, IL  11  -0.007  0.346  0.542 
Lyon, KS  7  -0.013  0.303  0.306 
Macoupin, IL  8  -0.006  0.256  0.206 
Marshall, KS  7  -0.034  0.629  1.946 
Martin, MN  10  -0.020  0.746  0.578 
McPherson, KS  7  -0.011  0.278  0.581 
Medina, TX  7  -0.021  0.302  0.235 
Montgomery, IL  9  -0.016  0.229  1.301 
Mower, MN  7  -0.018  0.910  0.340 
Randolph, IL  7  -0.004  0.234  0.484 
Renville, MN  8  -0.001  0.240  0.665 
Saunders, NE  11  -0.012  0.087  0.741 
Sioux, IA  9  -0.009  0.422  0.814 
Stephenson, IL  10  -0.013  0.284  0.316 
Story, IA  9  -0.003  0.804  0.219 
Sumner, KS  10  -0.011  0.297  0.450 
Trempealeau, WI  8  -0.010  0.336  0.761 
Vermilion, IL  9  -0.012  0.248  0.195 
Vermilion, LA  7  -0.010  0.261  0.382 
Vernon, WI  7  -0.022  0.606  0.730 
Wood, WI  7  -0.009  0.334  0.228 
Correlation  -0.395  -0.135 
R
2 (1)  0.156  0.018 
R
2 (2)  0.174 
We report cross-sectional results for local banking markets in selected rural areas in the U.S. in Panel 
B for 2005. The H-Statistics are calculated by regressing the ratio of interest revenue to total assets on 
the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits (proxy for funding costs), personnel expenses to total 
assets (proxy for labor cost), administrative expenses to total assets (proxy for price of fixed capital), 
and control variables (loans to total assets, equity to total assets, and bank size, whereby all financial 
variables  enter  the  regression  in  logs.  We  present  correlation  coefficients  between  the  Boone 
indicators and the other variables, and R
2 (1) OLS regression statistics of the Boone indicator on the 
respective variables to examine how much variation in the Boone indicator is explained by the other 
features of competition. The variable branches/population captures the number of branch offices per 
1,000  inhabitants.  The  final  row  presents  the  coefficient  of  determination  R
2  (2)  for  an  OLS 









Table 3: The effect of competition on efficiency 
Panel A: European Sample  Panel B: Local U.S. markets  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Estimator  Fixed effects  Fixed effects  Two-stage least 
squares 
Two-stage least 




Dependent variable  Cost efficiency  Cost efficiency  Cost efficiency  Cost efficiency  Cost efficiency  Cost efficiency  Cost efficiency  Cost efficiency 
Competition indicator                  
Boone indicator   -0.101**  -0.139**  -3.017***  -3.599***  -0.0089***  -0.0086***  -0.0374**  -0.0461** 
  (-2.09)  (-2.44)  (-12.4)  (-11.6)  (-2.72)  (-2.68)  (-2.24)  (-2.50) 
Bank-specific variables                 
Market share     0.132    -0.167    -0.0110    0.0383 
    (1.11)    (-1.07)    (-0.12)    (0.25) 
Total assets (log)    0.0010    -0.0080***    0.0078    -0.0001 
    (0.60)    (-2.75)    (0.59)    (-0.0007) 
Asset growth     -0.0095***    -0.0095***    0.0141    0.0086 
    (-5.57)    (-3.63)    (0.46)    (0.28) 
Asset growth squared     0.0032***    0.0023    -0.0007    -0.0007 
    (4.62)    (1.01)    (-0.42)    (-0.41) 
Country-specific variables                 
HHI     -0.0079    0.172***    -0.0020    -0.0195 
    (-0.33)    (5.48)    (-0.043)    (-0.41) 
Banking system assets (log)    -0.0022*    -0.0178***    -0.0047    0.0051 
    (-1.86)    (-8.29)    (-0.33)    (0.25) 
Time effect                 
Time trend  0.0010***  0.0014***  0.0080***  0.0111***         
  (6.55)  (6.32)  (11.6)  (10.9)         
                 
Observations  16646  16646  16230  16230  378  378  378  378 
Number of banks  3161  3161  2745  2745  378  377  377  377 
R2  0.0090  0.0167  0.0514  0.0461  0.0228  0.0265  0.0307  0.03723 
Durbin-Wu-Hausmann test χ2  n/a  n/a  511.24***  483.73***  n/a  n/a  4.34  6.45** 
Anderson Test χ2  n/a  n/a  245.686***  192.937***  n/a  n/a  21.538***  18.492*** 
Hansen J-Test χ2  n/a  n/a  1.522  2.557  n/a  n/a  0.472  0.003 
F-Test model χ2  36.62***  13.36***  89.39***  22.35***  7.40***  14.66***  4.97**  10.52*** 
Panel A reports results for the European sample. In column (1) and (2) we use fixed effects panel models. Column (3) and (4) in Panel A use 2SLS estimators and we instrument the 
Boone indicator with lagged values of Financial Freedom, and lagged interactions term between market share and loan growth. We presents results for the sample of rural U.S. 
markets in Panel B. Column (1) and (2) in Panel B use OLS, and column (3) and (4) in Panel B use 2SLS whereby we instrument the Boone indicator with lagged values of 
population (log) and an lagged interaction term between market share and loan growth. Robust t statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered on the bank level in Panel A. 
Explanatory variables lagged by one period unless stated otherwise.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 4: The effect of competition on bank soundness in Europe 
Estimator  Fixed effects  Two-stage least squares  Two-stage least squares   Two-stage least squares 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 










Small banks  Large banks  Capital ratio  ROA  S.D. ROA 
Bank-specific variables                   
Total assets (log)  -0.2044***  -0.201***  -0.2198***  -0.206***  -0.260***  -0.179***  -0.0213***  -0.00166***  -0.000481*** 
  (-15.26)  (-14.4)  (-14.86)  (-14.7)  (-15.4665)  (-8.9927)  (-10.8085)  (-4.9999)  (-2.8945) 
Asset growth  -0.0003  -0.0108  0.0211*  -0.00667  0.0421**  -0.0247  0.000527  -0.000340  0.000216* 
  (-0.04)  (-1.04)  (1.79)  (-0.61)  (2.5499)  (-1.6325)  (0.4867)  (-1.3216)  (1.9150) 
Diversification index  -0.5871***  -0.597***  -0.5846  -0.597***  -0.508***  -0.712***  -0.0494***  -0.00664***  -0.00162*** 
  (-14.21)  (-14.6)  (-13.79)  (-14.6)  (-12.0394)  (-10.3251)  (-9.3551)  (-6.1621)  (-2.8602) 
Loan loss provisions/Total assets  -4.2818***  -4.366***  -3.6263***  -4.208***  -3.839***  -5.777***  -0.0308  -0.256***  0.0216*** 
  (-8.83)  (-8.82)  (-7.87)  (-8.59)  (-6.1546)  (-9.4032)  (-0.4824)  (-10.5435)  (3.0887) 
Country-specific variables                   
Herfindahl Hirschman index  -0.2900***  -0.290***  -0.1086  -0.238***  0.0295  -0.869***  -0.0464***  -0.00670*  -0.00382* 
  (-3.63)  (-3.55)  (-1.16)  (-2.73)  (0.3487)  (-4.1903)  (-3.9309)  (-1.8943)  (-1.9564) 
Banking system assets (log)  0.0079**  0.00925***  0.0021  0.00713**  0.00621  0.0198***  0.00115***  -6.49e-05  3.16e-05 
  (2.28)  (2.60)  (0.57)  (2.03)  (1.6298)  (3.2887)  (2.8599)  (-0.6208)  (0.5715) 
GDP per capita (log, t-2)    0.476**    0.521**  0.691***  0.138  0.0421***  -0.000625  0.00223 
    (2.33)    (2.46)  (2.8416)  (0.4833)  (3.1272)  (-0.1611)  (1.2868) 
Unemployment (t-2)    0.000342    -0.000906  0.00402  -0.0167***  0.000280  -0.000389***  0.000131*** 
    (0.12)    (-0.35)  (1.3216)  (-4.3282)  (1.0232)  (-6.2278)  (4.1485) 
Competition indicator                   
Boone indicator  -5.0054***  -5.263***  -9.1704***  -6.540***  -9.409***  -5.100***  -0.226***  -0.251***  -0.00432 
  (-16.64)  (-16.5)  (-8.30)  (-10.5)  (-11.8104)  (-5.6167)  (-3.7455)  (-14.6569)  (-0.4592) 
                   
Time effect                   
Time trend  0.0331***  0.0254***  0.0406***  0.0269***  0.0271***  0.0298***  0.00175***  0.000267***  -5.45e-05 
  (28.96)  (7.60)  (16.01)  (8.40)  (6.6852)  (6.9493)  (6.6594)  (3.7913)  (-1.6240) 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes       
Observations  17965  17965  17568  17568  7905  9469  17568  17568  17568 
Number of banks  3325  3325  2928  2928  1658  1585  0.1904  0.1479  0.0162 
R
2   0.2576  0.2610  0.2306  0.2585  0.2164  0.3043  2928  2928  2928 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test χ
2  n/a  n/a  98.99***  10.28***  85.75***  0.02  1.11  24.74***  6.31** 
Anderson Test χ
2   n/a  n/a  512.801***  2843.872***  320.421***  523.817***  803.831***  803.831***  803.831*** 
Hansen J-Test χ
2  n/a  n/a  2.091  1.793  0.183  1.207  0.454  4.640**  1.894 
F-Test model χ2/Wald model χ2  173.22***  167.58***  167.65***  151.83***  81.08***  99.23***  109.88***  130.97***  10.62***  
Dependent variable: Z-score (log). Columns (1) and (2) report panel data models with bank-fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) present 2SLS models using an interaction term of market share 
and loan growth and Financial Freedom as instruments for the Boone indicator. Columns (5) and (6) report the regressions separately for small and large banks, whereby we use the median 
bank size in the sample as a cut-off point. Regressions (7)-(9) use the components of the Z-score as dependent variables to understand what drives the negative relationship between the Boone 
indicator and the Z-scores in detail. Robust t statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered on the bank level. Explanatory variables lagged by one period unless stated otherwise. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 39 
 
Table 5: The effect of competition on bank soundness in Europe – Quantile regression estimates 
Estimator  Two-stage quantile regressions 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 















Bank-specific variables           
Total assets (log)  -0.0102*  -0.0162***  -0.0341***  -0.0403***  -0.0304*** 
  (-1.67)  (-3.41)  (-3.97)  (-7.79)  (-4.13) 
Asset growth  -0.135***  -0.0937***  -0.0439  -0.0339  -0.0523* 
  (-3.45)  (-3.58)  (-1.10)  (-1.26)  (-1.73) 
Diversification index  -1.034***  -0.959***  -0.745***  -0.543***  -0.187 
  (-12.0)  (-15.0)  (-6.83)  (-8.26)  (-1.62) 
Loan loss provisions/Total assets  -19.86***  -20.26***  -20.61***  -18.11***  -8.469* 
  (-13.4)  (-13.9)  (-10.3)  (-6.12)  (-1.65) 
Country-specific variables           
Herfindahl Hirschman index  -2.685***  -2.668***  -1.564***  -1.346***  -1.117 
  (-6.34)  (-6.53)  (-4.65)  (-2.92)  (-1.27) 
Banking system assets (log)  -0.0180**  -0.0462***  -0.0566***  -0.0598***  -0.0660*** 
  (-2.22)  (-6.81)  (-8.71)  (-6.36)  (-4.34) 
GDP per capita (log, t-2)  -0.377***  -0.379***  -0.128  0.309***  0.579*** 
  (-3.54)  (-4.54)  (-1.27)  (4.35)  (4.03) 
Unemployment (t-2)  0.000320  -0.00309  -0.00771  0.00329  0.00222 
  (0.035)  (-0.49)  (-0.98)  (0.67)  (0.22) 
Competition indicator           
Boone indicator  -6.462***  -6.783***  -10.02***  -12.53***  -16.33*** 
  (-8.36)  (-11.6)  (-9.39)  (-15.2)  (-12.4) 
           
Time effect           
Time trend  0.0390***  0.0385***  0.0446***  0.0436***  0.0505*** 
  (12.6)  (18.0)  (14.1)  (15.7)  (12.6) 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  17965  17965  17965  17965  17965 
Number of banks  3325  3325  3325  3325  3325 
R
2   n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test χ
2  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Anderson Test χ
2   n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Hansen J-Test χ
2  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
F-Test model χ2/Wald model χ2  1006.99***  2282.33***  2789.28***  2549.45***  1403.43*** 
F-Test for quantile coefficients  58.52*** 
Dependent variable: Z-score (log). The regressions use two stage quantile regression estimators, the regression setup is as in columns (2), (4), 
(5) and (6) of Table 4. Explanatory variables lagged by one period unless stated otherwise. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 40 
 































Dependent variable: Z-score (log). Column (1) and (2) report OLS estimates. Columns (3) and (4) use 2SLS models using county population (log), and an interaction term of 
market share and loan growth for the Boone indicator.  Columns (5) and (6) present the regressions separately for small and large banks, whereby we use the median bank size in 
the sample as a cut-off point. Regressions (7)-(9) use the components of the Z-score as dependent variables to understand what drives the negative relationship between the Boone indicator 
and the Z-scores in detail. Robust t statistics in parentheses. Explanatory variables lagged by one period unless stated otherwise. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Estimator  OLS  Two-stage least squares  Two-stage least squares  Two-stage least squares 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 










Small banks  Large banks  Capital ratio  ROA  S.D. ROA 
Bank specific-variables                   
Total assets (log)  0.143  0.156  -0.0258  -0.00313  0.432  0.980**  -0.00612**  0.000250*  -0.000168 
  (1.0720)  (1.2345)  (-0.0634)  (-0.0092)  (0.6286)  (2.3037)  (-2.2558)  (1.6799)  (-0.0315) 
Asset growth  0.760**  0.385  -0.240  -0.0232  -2.963  1.067*  -0.0174*  0.000326  -0.00259 
  (2.2588)  (1.1399)  (-0.3849)  (-0.0459)  (-0.8012)  (1.6666)  (-1.7991)  (1.1090)  (-0.3133) 
Diversification index  -3.226***  -3.694***  -6.393**  -6.630**  -12.99***  -1.182  -0.114***  -0.00139  0.0962** 
  (-2.6721)  (-3.0244)  (-2.0690)  (-2.3988)  (-2.7669)  (-0.5125)  (-3.5614)  (-1.0340)  (2.1802) 
Loan loss provisions/Total assets  -297.7*  -291.8*  599.6  593.0  1742  -496.7  -2.135  -0.0595  -10.35 
  (-1.9424)  (-1.8560)  (0.7707)  (0.9660)  (1.5304)  (-1.2539)  (-0.4595)  (-0.1930)  (-1.0898) 
Country-specific variables                   
                   
Herfindahl-Hirschman index  -0.285  0.801  -1.492*  0.885  1.486  -0.108  0.00141  -0.00156  -0.0144 
  (-0.3496)  (1.0979)  (-1.9041)  (0.9984)  (0.9369)  (-0.0648)  (0.1522)  (-0.6918)  (-0.9283) 
Total banking system assets (log)  -1.145***  -0.388  0.179  0.390  0.0392  -0.479  0.0204***  0.000283**  0.000419 
  (-5.5632)  (-1.5081)  (0.5836)  (1.3479)  (0.0660)  (-1.0703)  (6.4160)  (2.1690)  (0.0915) 
Personal income (log, t-2)    -0.000245***    -0.000219***  -0.000265***  -0.000132*  -2.17e-06**  -9.75e-08***  3.34e-06*** 
    (-5.8873)    (-3.7851)  (-2.5786)  (-1.7488)  (-2.3681)  (-3.2943)  (3.4956) 
Unemployment (t-2)    -0.177**    0.516**  1.084***  -0.159  0.00153  -7.60e-05  -0.00745** 
    (-2.0635)    (2.5315)  (2.6705)  (-1.0738)  (0.7831)  (-0.8848)  (-2.3037) 
Competition indicator                   
                   
Boone indicator  -0.0735*  -0.0602  -2.693***  -2.371***  -3.499***  -0.854***  -0.0111**  -0.000383*  0.0371*** 
  (-1.6642)  (-1.2293)  (-4.3303)  (-4.2564)  (-3.3657)  (-2.9785)  (-2.0708)  (-1.9590)  (4.1930) 
                   
Observations/Number of banks  382  382  382  382  273  109  382  382  382 
R
2  0.1015  0.1740  0.2191  0.2938  -2.7564  0.1134  0.8911  0.7516  0.0588 
Durbin-Wu-Hausmann test χ
2  n/a  n/a  68.71***  48.64***  55.44***  13.66***  129.49***  2.55  4.08** 
Anderson Test χ
2  n/a  n/a  26.610***  24.404***  7.112*  22.981***  24.404  24.404***  24.404*** 
Hansen J-Test χ
2  n/a  n/a  7.241**  6.871**  5.182*  5.675*  11.863***  2.869  8.679* 
F-Test model χ
2/Wald model χ
2   9.23***  10.21***  8.72***  12.38***  7.79***  6.07***  426.69***  219.72***  53.29*** 41 
 































Dependent variable: Z-score (log). Column We report two-stage quantile regression estimates based on the regression setup in columns 
(2), (4), (5), and (6) in Table 6. Explanatory variables lagged by one period unless stated otherwise. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Estimator  Two-stage quantile regressions 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 










Bank specific-variables           
Total assets (log)  -0.0129  -0.0260  -0.0161  0.125  -0.0587 
  (-0.2604)  (-0.5120)  (-0.0646)  (0.2180)  (-0.1218) 
Asset growth  -0.301  -0.292  -0.290  0.00824  -0.322 
  (-0.9399)  (-0.7192)  (-0.2489)  (0.0031)  (-0.1554) 
Diversification index  -1.232***  -1.509***  -2.856  -11.08**  -5.707 
  (-2.5889)  (-2.7373)  (-0.8087)  (-2.0598)  (-1.3936) 
Loan loss provisions/Total assets  55.45  13.91  135.2  1162  699.5 
  (0.5314)  (0.1197)  (0.1996)  (0.8648)  (0.6431) 
Country-specific variables           
           
Herfindahl-Hirschman index  0.269  0.175  0.328  -0.963  -2.540 
  (1.0919)  (1.1412)  (0.2668)  (-0.3540)  (-0.7890) 
Total banking system assets (log)  0.0660  0.0512  0.186  0.438  0.706 
  (0.7359)  (0.4775)  (0.4023)  (0.4528)  (0.8104) 
Personal income (log, t-2)  0.0000  -0.0001**  -0.0001  -0.0002*  -0.0002** 
  (-1.3430)  (-2.2627)  (-0.7347)  (-1.8059)  (-2.1424) 
Unemployment (t-2)  0.0662  0.0292  0.137  0.956*  0.755 
  (1.5149)  (0.5681)  (0.4172)  (1.6630)  (1.3333) 
Competition indicator           
           
Boone indicator  -0.236*  -0.201  -0.779  -3.913**  -2.953* 
  (-1.6743)  (-1.1656)  (-0.6219)  (-2.3154)  (-1.6518) 
           
Observations/Number of banks  382  382  382  382  382 
R
2  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Durbin-Wu-Hausmann test χ
2  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Anderson Test χ
2  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Hansen J-Test χ
2  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
F-Test model χ
2/Wald model χ
2   12.43  23.50***  1.61  27.50***  55.93*** 




Figure 1: Boone indicators in European countries  
 
 









































































Figure 3: Quantile regression estimates of Boone indicator (European sample) 
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